The Hacker Chronicles - A…the Computer Underground/The Hacker Chronicles - A Tour of the Computer Underground (P-80 Systems).iso/misc/v05i013.txt

Internet Message Format | 1992-09-27 | 35KB

From:       Kenneth R. van Wyk (The Moderator) <[e-mail]>
Errors-To: [e-mail]
To:       [e-mail]
Path:      cert.sei.cmu.edu!krvw
Subject:   VIRUS-L Digest V5 #13
Reply-To:  [e-mail]
--------
VIRUS-L Digest   Thursday, 23 Jan 1992    Volume 5 : Issue 13

Today's Topics:

Re: QEMM386's LOADHI with VSHIELD1 and/or VIRSTOP (PC)
Reply to Smulders-virus found? (PC)
FixMBR and very large disks - potential problem (PC)
re: SBC? (PC)
Michelangelo & (some) Zeniths (PC)
Re: Novell Viruses (PC)
Unknown Virus? (PC)
Flip virus (PC)
Virus found: Flip (PC)
Re: NCSA has tested Antivirus Programs (PC)
Re: Trojan definition? Special case
Need some simple statistics
Antivirus Methods Congress
Re: Report: 8th Chaos Computer Congress
Re: Gulf War Virus & "Softwar"
FLASH Virus
Re: New Antivirus Organization Announced
program update from Padgett Peterson (PC)
F-PROT 2.02 now available (PC)

VIRUS-L is a moderated, digested mail forum for discussing computer
virus issues; comp.virus is a non-digested Usenet counterpart.
Discussions are not limited to any one hardware/software platform -
diversity is welcomed.  Contributions should be relevant, concise,
polite, etc.  (The complete set of posting guidelines is available by
FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu or upon request.)  Please sign submissions
with your real name.  Send contributions to [e-mail]
(that's equivalent to VIRUS-L at LEHIIBM1 for you BITNET folks).
Information on accessing anti-virus, documentation, and back-issue
archives is distributed periodically on the list.  Administrative mail
(comments, suggestions, and so forth) should be sent to me at:
[e-mail].

   Ken van Wyk

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 05:29:34 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (McAfee Associates)
Subject: Re: QEMM386's LOADHI with VSHIELD1 and/or VIRSTOP (PC)

Hello Jim Hendee,

You should be able to load VSHIELD V85 high with QEMM V5.1 by running
VSHIELD with the /LH option.  You shouldn't use the LOADHI program.

Regards,

Aryeh Goretsky
McAfee Associates Technical Support
- --
- - - -
McAfee Associates        | Voice [phone] | [e-mail]  (business)
4423 Cheeney Street      | FAX   [phone] | "Welcome to the alligator
Santa Clara, California  | BBS   [phone] | farm..."
95054-0253  USA          | v.32  [phone] | CompuServe ID: 76702,1714
ViruScan/CleanUp/VShield | HST   [phone] | or GO VIRUSFORUM

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 11:34:50 +0100
From:    [e-mail]
Subject: Reply to Smulders-virus found? (PC)

Dear Bert Plat,

On "Thu, 16 Jan 92 14:21:47" you wrote in digest 5-010 :

> "Tangram finds virus:
>
> Tangram in Utrecht (NL) warns about the recently found 'Smulders'-virus.
> This virus renames all directories up tto two levels deep to
> Criminal.XXX.

Yes, that is the same new Dutch virus (Ultimate Weapon) reported by me
in VIRUS-L digest 5-004 :

>>    I've got a friend with a possible virus on his disks...
>> SCANV85 doesn't detect this beast.  He has a HISCREEN 386sx
>> machine. I haven't seen the problem myself, but after discussion
>> I understood the following:
>>
>> Symptoms:
>> - It appears that the 'virus' is activated after january 1-st, 1992
>>
>> - After boot, a message is displayed:
>>
>>    +-------------------------------------------+
>>    ! The Ultimate Weapon has arrived,          !
>>    ! please contact the nearest police station !
>>    ! to tell about the illegal copying of you  !
>>    +-------------------------------------------+
>>
>>    (Yes, I had a 'printscreen' of the message)
>>    (No, I don't know if he has an illegal copy of a program ;-))
>>
>> - System hangs.
>>
>> - After boot from floppy in A: he found ALL his files and directory's
>>   in the root and next directory-level renamed to CRIMINAL.001,
>>   CRIMINAL.002, CRIMINAL.003 ..... etc.

    I've had contact with my friend, he could reproduce the problem...
The virus was found in COMMAND.COM of a MS-DOS 5.0 system.
COMMAND.COM has grown with 2601 bytes.  A 'grep' on COMMAND.COM didn't
find the string 'Ultimate', probably the message is encripted.  This
virus is of the 'stealth' type (original size of COMMAND.COM is shown
when a 'DIR' is done on the infected system).

    After I recovered from a (flu-)virus myself, I heard that our
local representative of McAfee Associates (CPU Communications) was
already notified about this virus (by someone else...).  They told
that the next version of SCAN will be able to recognize the new virus.
They even supplied the virus signature (MF00EVKUR). However I don't
know how to feed SCAN with this signature, SCAN expects a hexadecimal
string... maybe some of the readers can help me with that.

Greetings,
             Harrie Overdijk      Internet : [e-mail]
             ECN - Petten           BITNET : not any more
             The Netherlands      Noisenet : ++31-2246-4597
             Europe                Fidonet : 2:500/43.1902    (At home!)

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 08:51:13 -0500
From:    [e-mail] (A. Padgett Peterson)
Subject: FixMBR and very large disks - potential problem (PC)

    I have identified the *possibility* for an adverse reaction
between FixMBR and disks having sector sizes larger than 512 bytes. I
have never seen one but believe that there are some in use, primarily
with very large older disks (over 300 Mb). FixMBR v2.4 corrects this
potential problem.

Theoretical Symptoms: Following FixMBR22 use, system will not boot from hard
                      disk but will from floppy. Use of MBR80 restores system
                      (see documentation). Alternate recovery would be to
                      use DOS 5.0 FDISK/MBR or FixMBR24.

    Again, I have never seen this happen nor have I ever received
a report of such but *think* it *might* be possible & cannot test.
Those most common disks used in PCs (MFM, RLL, IDE, SCSI) have
standard 512 byte sectors and are not affected. In any event, FixMBR
v2.4 *should* handle everything.

                        Warmly,
                            Padgett

------------------------------

Date:    22 Jan 92 11:06:42 -0500
From:    "David.M.Chess" <[e-mail]>
Subject: re: SBC? (PC)

>From:    [e-mail] (...Jose)
>
>        Does anyone know anything about a virus that McAfee SCAN
>reports as SBC?

SBC is a resident infector of files that are executed, and COM, EXE,
and OVL files that are opened.  The first time an infected program is
run, it will try to infect the command interpreter (COMSPEC=, or
COMMAND.COM).  It infects both COM and EXE format files.  It is
"length-stealthed", in that if the virus is in memory the DIR command
will show the old, uninfected lengths.  It sets the seconds field of
infected files to 0x1F (==62), as usual.  It doesn't seem to have any
payload.  Since it infects files that are opened, scanning your system
with the virus in memory, using a scanner that doesn't know about the
virus, will tend to infect every file in your system...  DC

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 11:09:10 -0500
From:    [e-mail] (A. Padgett Peterson)
Subject: Michelangelo & (some) Zeniths (PC)

>From:    [e-mail]

>I had a Zenith 386 SX machine infected.  When booting up with the
>infected diskette, I get a "Disk read error" message.  When I reboot
>off the hard disk, I get a "Unable to read boot code from partition"
>message, and the computer is disabled unless I boot off the floppy.

Not surprising since some versions of Zenith's operating system expect
the MBR code to follow the specifications. Most other OSes do not
expect help and will boot anyway.

>If I run a CHKDSK, I still get 655360 bytes total memory.

Well, you booted off an uninfected floppy so the virus is not resident.
The CHKDSK test detects Mich when memory resident.

>xxx recognizes the existence of the virus but will not remove it.

Well either copy sector 7 back to sector 1 or try FixMBR24 (will let
you do the same thing).
                    Warmly,
                        Padgett

        [e-mail]

        "Usual Disclaimers Apply"

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 11:23:57 -0700
From:    [e-mail] (Kevin Hemsley)
Subject: Re: Novell Viruses (PC)

Doug Eckert <[e-mail]> writes:

 >I'm interested in obtaining a (believable) list that says which
 >viruses infect and/or spread through Novell local area networks,
 >and what effects they cause (error messages and the like).

The basic rule is only file infecting viruses can propagate on a
network.  This includes the file infecting characteristics of
multi-partite viruses.  Because of NetWare's redirection of BIOS and
DOS interrupts, normal BSI viruses cannot infect a NetWare file server
from a workstation.  Linking viruses also cannot propagate using
NetWare as there is no DOS directory entry to modify.

 >Only two of the five viruses tested, 1701 and Invader, proved
 >capable of circumventing the file attributes set by the Novell
                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
There is a clear distinction between NetWare RIGHTS and ATTRIBUTES.
ATTRIBUTES are an emulation and an extension of regular DOS file
attributes.  All DOS attributes (or NetWare ATTRIBUTES which exactly
emulate DOS attributes) can be changed by viruses.  Viruses can
therefor bypass certain Netware attributes.  There are only two
NetWare ATTRIBUTES which prohibit viral infection, they are EXECUTE
ONLY and surprisingly, SYSTEM.  The SYSTEM NetWare ATTRIBUTE does not
perfectly emulate the DOS system attribute, and does not permit viral
infection.  The 1701 virus used in your test CANNOT infect a file
protected by the NetWare SYSTEM ATTRIBUTE but it will zip right past a
DOS system attribute.

RIGHTS are NetWare's own security implementation and provide
substantial protection against viruses.  Viruses cannot directly alter
assigned effective RIGHTS.  However, assigned RIGHTS can be overridden
through the use of the SUPERVISORY RIGHT.  The SUPERVISORY right
supersedes any restrictions placed on subdirectories or files with an
inherited rights mask.

 >While successful at infecting C:\TESTEXEC files, repeated efforts
 >to get Jerusalem-B, 4096 and Whale to infect network files - to
 >which the user had all rights - were unsuccessful.

There are some viruses, such as 4096, which do very well on
stand-alone systems, but can't properly infect files stored on a
NetWare shared volume.  In fact, attempting to copy a 4096 infected
file from an infected workstation to a NetWare volume will disinfect
the file.  This is because of the stealth actives of 4096 and
NetWare's redirection of interrupts.  The 4096 uses single-stepping to
determine the original interrupt 21h and place its code.  Since
NetWare redirects this type of call, 4096 is unable to infect files
stored on the server.

I hope this helps.

- --
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Kevin Hemsley                             |
 Information & Technical Security          | If you think that you have someone
 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory     | eating out of your hand, it's a
 [phone]                            | good idea to count your fingers!
 [e-mail]                              |
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 18:33:05 +0000
From:    [e-mail]
Subject: Unknown Virus? (PC)

 My brother was installing an expanded memory manager he had
legitamately purchased and found what he thought was a virus.  Upon
rebooting the system, the following message flashed across the screen:

Look out!  Buy direct from Bob and Steve!

He took the disk in and scanned it using McAffee's SCAN, but nothing
turned up.  Is this a virus, or maybe just an extra tossed in by the
software designers?

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Jan 92 02:38:29 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Jeremy Wohl)
Subject: Flip virus (PC)

Hello,

Anybody heard of the Flip virus and how to get rid of it?  A friend
from Spain is convinced his machine is infected with this virus.

thanks.

- -jeremy
[e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    23 Jan 92 14:05:52 +0700
From:    Pim Clotscher <[e-mail]>
Subject: Virus found: Flip (PC)

L.S.,
Today, 23 january 1992 we found one (1) PC infected with the flip-
virus [Flip]. It was reported by McAfee's VSHIELD v77 being resident
at that PC after boot-up.

First booted from a clean MS-DOS 3.30 system disk.
Scan with McAfee's SCANv85 resulted in three infected 'files'.
1. a general partitiontable infection [GenP]
2. VSHIELD.EXE, externally infected LZEXE compressed file [Flip]
3. COMMAND.COM [Flip]

We were able to remove the infections in two passes, the first one
for the [GenP], the second for both [Flip]. Thank you, McAfee!

The Infected PC is one out of 16 in a public student facility, all
being a workstation in a Novell Netware 3.11 network. The route of
infection is unknown, but we think the infection took place through
running infected .EXE file(s) from a user's floppy disk. No other
PC's were infected so far, but as long as the infected floppy
circulates, there is a potential for re-infection (alas...).

The Erasmus University Rotterdam is a legal user of McAfee's
SCAN/CLEAN/VSHIELD through a negociated licence mediated by the dutch
SURFnet organization in Utrecht, the Netherlands.

Sincerely,

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Jan 92 16:54:00 +0200
From:    Y. Radai <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: NCSA has tested Antivirus Programs (PC)

  Vesselin Bontchev writes:

>There are currently several products, which claim to add a
>"self-disinfecting" envelope to other programs: I have only McAfee's
>FShield, but have heard about at least three more - The Untouchable,
>something from Central Point Software, and a product under
>development, which I discuss with someone from Bogota, Colombia (if I
>remember correctly, else - sorry)

Sorry, that's not accurate.  F-Shield (now called File Protector and
no longer associated with McAfee) does indeed add a self-disinfecting
envelope to other programs, but Untouchable certainly does not.  It
keeps all the disinfectant info in a central database. (It does check-
sum itself before checking other files and warns you if it has been
modified, but it does not *disinfect* itself on the fly as described
in your quote from Frisk.)

                                     Y. Radai
                                     Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Israel
                                     [e-mail]
                                     [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    21 Jan 92 22:18:27 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Johnathan Vail)
Subject: Re: Trojan definition? Special case

[e-mail] (Ralf Stephan) writes:

   I heard there was a collection for a FAQ list. Maybe this question
   belongs to it: What is the exact definition for "trojan"?

The definition I have in my glossary is:
________________
trojan (horse) - This is some (usually nasty) code that is added to,
    or in place of, a harmless program.  This could include many viruses
    but is usually reserved to describe code that does not replicate
    itself.
________________

[Moderator's note: Thanks for the FAQ submission.  I'm continuing to
put submissions in as they arrive.  As soon as we have a critical mass
of Q's and A's, I'll post a "beta" FAQ for everyone to review and
comment on.  BTW, I've gotten a number of suggestions on how/when I
should distribute the FAQ - thanks to all.  Comments and suggestions
are welcomed.]

   I would like to present you a special case where I would say,
   this is one, and I'm very interested in your opinion.

   Some week ago, someone uploaded a program in a BBS where
   anonymous uploading is possible. The program description given
   had some attributes that were sufficient to make the program a
   widely downloaded one. Keywords were: "sex","porno" et cetera...
   To admit, the author did all not to say what the program really
   was for.

   What the program did: It asked the user to free 20MB of hard
   disk space (if not already free), created a file with that length
   fully filled with "6"es and stuffed it on the screen. This should
   apparently be a joke since in German the words for "sex" and for
   the number 6 are spoken the same way. So the program actually
   intended no damage, but some users with small hard disks had
   problems with Murphy's law when freeing the space (they deleted
   files, you know).

   The story still is not ended because the program writer later
   claimed it to be a "scientific experiment"...

   So, is this a trojan or not? Where is the border between "damaging"
   and "not damaging"? Is it sufficient for a program to be a trojan
   if it does not what it says or intends?

I would say not.  It didn't masquerade as another program or hide
itself as part of another program.

Damaging or not is not part of the definition.  I would label it a
stupid immature prank, shun the author and forget about it.

And BTW, anyone who would download an untested program and follow
"suspect" instructions like that based on keywords like "sex" and
"porno" is just asking for trouble.  Some might suggest that these
people got what they deserved.

jv

"The time of day is no secret, but Apple still doesn't
 deserve the time of day." - RMS
 _____
|     | Johnathan Vail     [e-mail]     [phone]
|Tegra| [e-mail]    N1DXG@448.625-(WorldNet)
 -----  MEMBER: League for Programming Freedom ([e-mail])

------------------------------

Date:    22 Jan 92 06:22:16 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Gene Spafford)
Subject: Need some simple statistics

I am trying to do some simple calculations regarding the appearance of
new viruses for the PC.  In particular, I need some information on:
  * how many new viruses appeared on the scene in 1990?
  * how many new viruses appeared in the first half of 1991?
  * how many new viruses appeared in the second half of 1991?

If you believe you have a reliable source for any of these figures,
please MAIL me your figures along with your source.  Please specify if
your numbers are for distinct viruses, or for variants too. I will
summarize the answers I get back to this list.

Thanks in advance.

- --spaf
- --
Gene Spafford
NSF/Purdue/U of Florida  Software Engineering Research Center,
Dept. of Computer Sciences, Purdue University, W. Lafayette IN 47907-1398
Internet:  [e-mail]    phone:  [phone]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 10:35:20 -0500
From:    [e-mail] (A. Padgett Peterson)
Subject: Antivirus Methods Congress

    It is real & I have been asked to be a part of it (was waiting
to make sure that it was going to be not-for-profit). IMHO this type
of organization is something that we have been needing in this country
just like we need a national virus/anti-virus testing facility. Since
NIST has decided not to take an active role in the PC community (at
least that was how I interpreted Dennis's talk at the NCSA luncheon),
there is a definate vaccuum.

    Since the criteria for proper testing has gone beyond what I
have available in my Den Closet (though now equipped with a network),
and the magazines are apparently unable to provide such testing. We
NEED a proper non-profit public testing and communicating
organization.

    With March 6th fast approaching, I suspect that Dick is acting
in the best Kanban possible. It is not going to be perfect, it is
going to make misteaks, it is not going to make everybody happy 8*(,
but it is necessary and I intend to support it.

    Now keep in mind that Dick is a NewYorker so one must make
allowances but he and Judy have done an excellent job in conducting
the International Virus and Security Conference (March 12 & 13 this
year - plug) which will be concurrent with the first meeting of the
AMC. "Well, lets just see..."  (_The Legend & the Mission_ (C) 1989
Pontiac Motor Div GMC).

        Warmly now but in San Antonio (IMHO the nicest city in
                               America that's hard to get to) tomorrow,

                        Padgett
               [e-mail]

                         (usual disclaimers apply)

------------------------------

Date:    17 Jan 92 11:24:00 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: Report: 8th Chaos Computer Congress

[e-mail] writes:

> The following message was copied from RISKS-L.  Of particular  interest to
> VIRUS-L reader will be where the writer inserts 'comment #1'. That such

Yep... The review is from my boss, Prof. Klaus Brunnstein, who is the
head of the Virus Test Center at the University of Hamburg. I'll add
just a few corrections.

>      Remark #1: recent events (e.g. "Gulf hacks") and material presen ted on
>Chaos Congress '91 indicate that Netherland emerges as a new European center o
f
>  malicious attacks on systems and networks.  Among other potentially harmful

Yeah, we all have a bit of luck that Bulgaria does not have -wide-
access to computer communications... :-)

>  information, HACKTIC #14/15 publishes code of computer viruses (a BAT-virus
>  which does not work properly; "world's shortest virus" of 110 bytes, a
>  primitive non-resident virus significantly longer than the shortest resident
>  Bulgarian virus: 94 Bytes).  While many errors in the analysis show that the

Correction. The published "shortest virus" is in fact the shortest
(they believe) non-overwriting non-resident COM-file infector for
MS-DOS. It is 109 bytes, not 110. It was published in both source and
hex dump. The hex dump has obviously been entered by hand from an
assembly listing of the source, and by an unexperienced person, on the
top of that, that's why it is extremely buggy and will not work. The
source works perfectly, however, if assembled.

The shortest virus in the same class (Prof. Brunnstein is wrong here -
it is non-resident) is indeed Bulgarian and is indeed 94 bytes only.
However, it contains an undocumented instruction (POP CS), which works
only on 8086/8088 processors (not above).

>authors lack deeper insigth into malware technologies (which may change), thei
r
>criminal energy in publishing such code evidently is related to the fact that
>Netherland has no adequate computer crime legislation.  In contrast, the adven
t

Indeed, the lack of legislation leads to creation of computer viruses,
as my Bulgarian experience tells me... :-)

> not all topics have been reported.  All German texts are available from the
> author (in self-extracting file: ccc91.exe, about 90 kByte), or from CCC
> (e-mail: [e-mail], fax: [phone]).

Just a moment!!! We already got HUGE amount of requests, so we are
unable to send the proceedings by e-mail. Those of you who have ftp
access can get them from ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de [134.100.9.29],
directory /pub/virus/texts, file ccc91.zip. Just don't forget that the
texts are in German. If anybody volunteers to translate them in
English, we'll appreciate that. Please, upload anything virus-related
to the directory /pub/virus/incoming, *not* to the directory
/incoming.

Regards,
Vesselin
- --
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev        Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
[e-mail]  Fachbereich Informatik - AGN, rm. 107 C
Tel.:[phone], Fax: -226    Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, D-2000, Hamburg 54

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 10:04:40 -0700
From:    [e-mail] (James Davies)
Subject: Re: Gulf War Virus & "Softwar"

[e-mail] (Rich Travsky) writes:
>Regarding the Gulf War virus: Anyone remember the book "Softwar", by
>Thierry Breton and Denis Beneich? Came out in 1984. Been a while since
>I read it, goes something like this: The U.S. allows the Soviets to
>buy a super-computer. The chips were, uh, slightly modified. Or
>something like that. You can guess the rest. Fair reading as I recall.

I didn't read this book, but I remember seeing reviews and looking at
it in a bookstore.  The inane, implausible plot was that the US
allowed the USSR to smuggle a Cray-something into their country, and
that as soon as a particular weather condition came up in the weather
program (that all Crays run all the the time, of course, even ones
doing codebreaking in the Soviet Union), it started taking over all of
the other computers in the country.  Interoperability at its finest.
What I found especially laughable in the promotions for the book was
that one of the authors was described as some sort of incredible
computer genius, thus enhancing the plausibility of the book's
scenario.  I suspect that the guy had a C64 that he used to play video
games, given the deep technical understanding that the book appeared
to show...

>Too bad the Gulf War version seems to an April Fool's story. (We
>coulda had a sequel to the book!)

Heaven forbid.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 11:54:32 -0700
From:    [e-mail] (Kevin Hemsley)
Subject: FLASH Virus

[e-mail] (Rob Slade) writes:

 >"Upgradeable" means the *user* can update (*change*) his BIOS from a
 >program distributed on a floppy or other media.  The danger of flash
 >EAPROMs is a real area of concern and should not be taken lightly.

 >True, they have not hit the marketplace yet but figure:

Correction, Flash EPROM BIOS are on the market and have been for
several months now.  An EISA board designed by Anigma and marketed by
Swan Technologies is for sale at your local mail order catalogue.

 >This is the danger to be considered but fortunately it has been.  The
 >following things can/are being done:

 >* hardware enable of reprogramming (switch/jumper plug, etc)

According to Swans technical support the BIOS are upgraded by
"software-only, no hardware."

 >Most importantly is that different vendors are implementing their own
 >hardware and the lack of a "standard" should prevent any flash virus
 >from having a large enough culture to thrive in.

I agree that because of proprietary differences, and the fact that
most machines today do not have Flash EPROM BIOS, BIOS modifying
viruses will not become a significant issue.  Although I have no doubt
that someone will probably try, "just for the fun of it." :(

- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Kevin Hemsley                             |
 Information & Technical Security          | If you think that you have someone
 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory     | eating out of your hand, it's a
 [phone]                            | good idea to count your fingers!
 [e-mail]                              |
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    22 Jan 92 23:36:24 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Gene Spafford)
Subject: Re: New Antivirus Organization Announced

Here is a description of the Antivirus Methods Congress, direct from
Dick Lefkon himself (along with a paragraph about who Dick is):

Dick Lefkon ([e-mail]) is 1991-1992 President of
Antivirus Methods Congress.  His term of office ends spring 1992.  He
is program chair of the FIFTH INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER VIRUS & SECURITY
CONFERENCE to be held March 11-13 at the Loews Summit and Marriott in
New York.  Dick was asked to do the setup work for AMC in 1991 since
he had helped to start five of the eight SIGs at Data Processing
Management Association.  Of four clearance levels (researcher, vendor,
user practitioner, lay user), Dick ranks himself as a user
practitioner.

AMC was established to unite all constituencies in the struggle to
slow and eventually overcome the onslaught of malevolent code.
Specific committees for University Users, Corporate Users, Government
Users, Vendors, Telecom Users, and Non-DOS users have directly elected
chairs and make sure their constituencies receive proper liaison and
are not inadvertently ignored by the joint effort.  AMC does not
endorse any product or course.

Action Committees of AMC include Identification/Classification, Legal,
Credentials (includes clearance for virus swapping), Nonproliferation
(protections in swapping), Research Methods and possible others.  AMC
acts as a "frontend" for existing centers and efforts, a single
well-known referral point that the uninitiated user can contact with a
need and be sent directly to one or more existing parties.  AMC
"harmonizes" with other ongoing efforts and does not attempt to
supplant any.  No dues until spring vote, then $5 or $10 US
thereafter.  Quarterly or monthly thin newsletter (no scholarly
journal), with most productive committee work done via existing e-mail
and donated forum space.

Membership by sending name, address, e-mail and phone and saying
you hereby declare yourself a member.  Name your classification
if it's clear to you.
- --
Gene Spafford
NSF/Purdue/U of Florida  Software Engineering Research Center,
Dept. of Computer Sciences, Purdue University, W. Lafayette IN 47907-1398
Internet:  [e-mail]    phone:  [phone]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 22 Jan 92 07:37:00 -0500
From:    [e-mail]
Subject: program update from Padgett Peterson (PC)

Hello.

Just received and made available for FTP transfer FIXMBR24.ZIP.  This
is an update of A. Padgett Peterson FixMBR.  This update corrects a
potential problem with ESDI hard disks.

Best, Claude.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Claude Bersano-Hayes     HAYES @ URVAX                 (Vanilla BITNET)
University of Richmond   [e-mail]     (Bitnet or Internet)
Richmond, VA  23173

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Jan 92 15:53:21 +0700
From:    [e-mail] (Fridrik Skulason)
Subject: F-PROT 2.02 now available (PC)

Version 2.02 of F-prot is now available on SIMTEL20, and should be
available on beach.gal.utexas.edu in a day or two....

- -frisk

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Version 2.02 - corrections:

  "Secure Scan" used to report a "possible new variant of Yaunch" when
  scanning certain files, including some OS/2 executables - fixed.

  On certain old types of 360K floppy disk drives the scanner would not
  always detect a disk change - it would scan the boot sector correctly,
  but not the files contained on the diskette - fixed.

  "Analyse Program" would occasionally crash with a "Divide error"
  message - fixed.

  Version 2.01 had some problems when scanning Bernoulli boxes, and
  when run from the OS/2 DOS box - fixed.

Version 2.02 - improvements:

  "Secure Scan" is now several times as fast as previously, and it is now
  the default method.  "Full Scan" no longer exists.

  "Secure Scan" can now usually determine if data has been appended to a
  file after infection.

  "Secure Scan" can now also usually determine if a file has been
  infected by two different viruses, and should be able to remove them
  in the correct order.

  Memory scan is now much faster than previously, but can no longer be
  aborted by pressing ESC.

  As the first .SYS-infecting files have now been found "in the wild"
  outside Bulgaria, the set of default file extensions has been expanded
  to include "SYS" as well.

  It is now possible to scan for any combination of boot/file viruses,
  Trojans and user-defined patterns at the same time - previously a
  separate scan was required to search for user-defined patterns.

  The scanning report now includes a date/time stamp, as well as a
  description of the parameters used.

  The following command-line switches have been added.

      /ANALYSE      Uses heuristic analysis instead of signature-based
                    virus scanning.
      /HARD         Scan all DOS partitions on the hard disk.
      /MULTI        Scan multiple diskettes.
      /NET          Scan all network "drives".
      /REPORT=file  Saves the output to "file".
      /SILENT       Generates no screen output.

   "Analysis" no longer exists as a separate function in the main menu,
   but only as the third search method, in addition to Secure Scan and
   Quick Scan.

   The VIRSTOP.BIN file no longer exists.

   F-PROT.EXE now returns an exit code, which can be checked with an
   ERRORLEVEL command.  See COMMAND.DOC for further information.

Version 2.02 - new viruses:

  The following 75 new viruses (or new variants of old viruses) can be
  detected and removed with version 2.02

    _2330  (temporary name)
    Albania (429, 506, 575 and 606)
    AntiPascal 2 (440-B and 480-B)
    Anto
        Black Monday-Borderline
     Boojum
    Bulgarian Tiny-Ghost
    Burger-Pirate
    Burghofer
    Cascade-1701-S
    Checksum (1.00 and 1.01)
        Crazy imp
    CSL (V4 and V5)
        Dada
     Dark Avenger-null
    Day/10
        DM (310 and 400-1.01)
        Feist
    Hitchcok
    Hungarian-473
        Hydra (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8)
    ILL
    JD (158, 276, 356, 392, 448 and 460)
        Jerusalem (Einstein, Miky and T13)
        Lao Doung
     MH-757
    Mosquito-Topo
    MSTU-554
    Murphy-Amilia
    MPS-OPC-EXE-4.01
    NV71 (only 1827 bytes long, not 1840 as reported elsewhere)
    Orion (262 and 365)
    Pixel-Rosen
    QMU-1513
        Shadowbyte-635
    Sistor (2225 and 2380)
        Smallv-115
    South African-623
        Stoned-NoInt
    Surrender
        Sylvia-C
    Tokyo
    Trivial-44
    Tumen-1.2
    V-472
        V-905-765 (The family name may be changed soon)
        VCS-Manta
        VCS-VDV-853
        Vienna-625
    Voronezh-Chemist
    Words (1391 and 1485)

  The following 33 new viruses can now be detecte
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